Prior research has documented that earnings announcements provide information not only about the announcing firm but also about other firms in the same industry. We document a stock market anomaly associated with this phenomenon of intra-industry information transfers by showing that the stock price movements of late announcers in response to earnings reported by early announcers are negatively correlated with the subsequent price responses of late announcers to their own earnings reports. Apparently, the stock market overestimates the intra-industry implications of early announcers' earnings for late announcers' earnings, and that overestimation is corrected when late announcers disclose their earnings.
Introduction
Beginning with Foster (1981) , prior research has shown that earnings announcements provide information about other firms in the same industry (other related research includes Han, Wild and Ramesh, 1989 , Han and Wild, 1990 , Freeman and Tse, 1992 , and Ramnath, 2002 and that stock prices of non-announcing firms reflect such intra-industry information transfers. In this paper, we investigate whether stock prices of firms that have not yet announced (late announcers) respond appropriately to earnings reports of early announcers. Specifically, if the information transfers implied by early announcer's disclosures are properly incorporated into the stock prices of late announcers, there should be no predictable price movements when those late announcers subsequently report their earnings. That is, we check for zero correlation between the late announcer's price responses at the two earnings announcements.
Our results reveal a strong negative correlation between the two price responses, which suggests that stock prices for the late announcers overreact to the information transfer from the early announcer's earnings and that overreaction is corrected when the late announcer's earnings are revealed. These results are surprising not only because they suggest systematic mispricing, but also because we show that all other pairs of non-contemporaneous returns are positively related (including the early announcer's price responses at the two dates and the returns for the late announcer before and after the two dates). In effect, we identify an island of overreaction amidst a sea of underreaction. Our evidence of a negative correlation differs from the positive correlation observed in Ramnath (2002) . There are, however, a number of differences between the two studies. Ramnath focuses only on first announcers, requires a minimum of five analysts and 20 quarters of prior earnings, investigates a limited sample period (from the first quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 1997), and forms industry groups based on analyst following, rather than industry classification codes. While we do not attempt to reconcile differences in results, we find overreaction is weaker for first announcers (the first difference between the studies noted above).
Whereas a newly-documented stock market anomaly naturally gives rise to plausible "irrational investor" explanations, it is appropriate to also consider carefully other competing explanations that do not involve investor irrationality. The complex nature of this anomaly (one instance of overreaction surrounded by many instances of underreaction) suggests that we investigate even more diligently these other competing explanations. The first such explanation is suggested by the price reversals documented in the Finance literature (e.g., Jegadeesh 1990; Lehmann 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman 1995a; Subrahmanyam 2005) for very short windows (e.g., one week or one month).
2 That literature has recognized the potential for these reversals to be due partially to market microstructure effects (e.g., Lehmann, 1990 and Subrahmanyam, 2005) . 3 In addition to including controls for three known market microstructure effects-market capitalization, liquidity, and turnover, we provide a general control for potential effects that are not yet known by incorporating the overreaction observed for pseudo events during nonannouncement periods; i.e., we conservatively require that the overreaction observed in this context exceeds that documented in the price reversal literature.
The second such competing explanation we investigate carefully is whether our results could be due to systematic changes in risk that remain uncontrolled for. 4 Given the short windows over which we measure returns, however, we believe mismeasured risk is unlikely to be an explanation (the risk changes necessary to explain our results would be unreasonably 2 Prior literature has documented overreaction for very short horizons (weekly and monthly), underreaction at short horizons (3 to 12 months), and overreaction at long horizons (3 to 5 years). There is disagreement about whether the very short term return reversal anomaly should be interpreted as evidence of the market's overreaction to firm-specific news (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman 1995b; Conrad, Gultekin, and Kaul 1997) .
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Market microstructure effects include biases in measured returns because they are based systematically on bid or ask prices as well as temporary deviations of quoted prices from equilibrium values due to liquidity shocks. large). Additionally, given the complex pattern of abnormal returns that is observed, it is hard to justify why a similarly complex pattern of risk changes would occur in this case.
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If our conclusion of market overreaction in this particular instance withstands further scrutiny, it presents a new challenge for extant investor irrationality theories because of certain unique features of the anomaly we document. First, as mentioned above, while investors overreact to the information transferred from early announcers' earnings, they appear to underreact to all other information. Since most available theories are designed to explain the more prevalent underreaction observed over the short term (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998; Subrahmanyam 1998, 2001; and Hong and Stein 1999) , it will likely be difficult to also explain evidence of overreaction over the short term for a subset of information. (Some of these theories do allow for overreaction, but that is projected to occur over the long term.) Similarly, mispricing explanations that are based on the market's inability to fully appreciate earnings information spillovers across quarters for the same firm (e.g., post-earningsannouncement-drift and post-analyst-revision-drift) do not appear to fit here, since in this case the market recognizes information spillovers, even though they occur across firms in the same industry rather than over time, but overestimates the magnitude of across-firm spillovers.
Second, investors overreact to some but not all intra-industry information transfers.
Specifically, there is no evidence that early announcers overreact to earnings releases of firms that announce later. Finally, this anomaly differs from most other anomalies because the underlying event is other firms' information releases, rather than the release of information by 5 We also confirm that our anomaly is not driven by the positive lead/lag cross-correlations across firms suggested by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) (also see Badrinath, Kale, and Noe 1995 and Swaminathan 2000) . That is, the negative correlation between returns for late announcing firms during the two windows observed in cross-sectional regressions could be due entirely to the positive correlation between returns for early announcers during the first window and returns for late announcers during the second window. We confirm that this is not the case here, by documenting a negative correlation between returns for late announcers during the two windows in time-series regressions (results available upon request).
the same firm (e.g., earnings news, dividend announcements, and stock splits). 6 In addition to introducing an anomaly that is based on relations across firms, the fact that the anomaly suggests that some firms overreact to other firms' news appears to run counter to the general sense of underreaction to other firms' news implied by the positive lead/lag return relations documented here across firms within the same industry.
We propose one explanation for overreaction to intra-industry information transfers and why that overreaction might increase over time until the late announcer discloses its earnings.
Consider how a stock market estimates the prospects for a late announcing firm given that the market is predictably surprised when early announcers report earnings news that is positively correlated with the earnings news disclosed by firms that have announced even earlier.
Consistent with the representativeness heuristic bias discussed in behavioral finance (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974 , Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998 , and Chan, Frankel, and Kothari, 2004 , as each subsequent early announcing firm releases earnings that appears to confirm on average the news released by firms reporting earnings before them, the stock price of the late announcing firm adjusts via a series of price movements that are on average positively correlated. If so, the late announcer's stock price might overreact, relative to the earnings report it will eventually disclose, and the degree of overreaction might increase as additional confirmation occurs from subsequent early announcers. This overreaction would be corrected when the late announcer reports its earnings.
We offer some preliminary thoughts and analyses on more comprehensive explanations involving investor irrationality that are consistent with stock prices overreacting to information transfers from early announcers to late announcers and yet underreacting to all other information.
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A notable exception is the recent work on a momentum anomaly based on supplier-customer relations (e.g., Menzly and Ozbas 2006; Cohen and Frazzini 2006) .
We make some progress by considering and rejecting potential explanations that are based on biases suggested in the behavioral finance literature as well as the correlation structure of earnings surprises (both over time and across firms). Despite the reasons mentioned earlier that make it particularly hard to find a simple explanation for the overreaction/underreaction patterns documented in this case, we are able to fashion one extension to our overreaction explanation that is consistent with the evidence presented here. That extension is based on a) earnings information consisting of two components, one which has spillover effects for future quarters and another that does not, and b) intra-industry information transfers from early announcers to late announcers consisting mainly of the second component.
We do not seek to show that this apparent pricing anomaly represents a profitable trading strategy that can be implemented. To do that we would not only need to document profits earned by a strategy that does not presume knowledge of firm i's announcement date (e.g., take positions based on expected announcement dates for firm i, and then hold that position until the announcement actually occurs), but also show that the results from that strategy exceed transactions costs. 7 Our objective here is limited to pointing out that stock prices for late announcers appear to overreact to implications of news released by early announcing industry peers and that prices are subsequently corrected when the late announcer's earnings are released.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and variables analyzed, and Section 3 contains our main results, which show that overreaction exists and is unlikely to be due to microstructure effects or mismeasured risk. In Section 4 we investigate the validity of the explanation we offer for the observed overreaction, and Section 5 7
Our results are, however, relevant for the timing of purchase/sale of these late announcers for investors intending to buy or sell these stocks for other reasons. Investors intending to buy firm i should do so after (before) firm i's earnings announcement if the industry news is good (bad) and follow the opposite strategy if they intend to sell firm i. And if our results survive an effort to implement a strategy that does not presume knowledge of firm i's announcement date, this mispricing could be relevant to investors who are able to trade at low transactions costs.
provides the results of robustness tests. Section 6 discusses the results of our efforts to explain why stock prices could overreact to intra-industry information transfers and yet underreact to all other earnings information, and Section 7 concludes.
Sample selection, key variables, and descriptive statistics
The sample data are obtained from three sources: a) firms' quarterly earnings and announcement dates are from quarterly Compustat files, b) stock return data are from CRSP daily return files, and c) book-to-market, accruals, and other financial variables are from annual As argued in Fama (1998) , the choice of the return expectation model is less important in short-window return studies, since daily expected returns are close to zero. In this paper, we use excess returns and abnormal returns interchangeably. We skip non-trading days when measuring returns over earnings announcement windows. For example, the 3-day return period is from Monday to Wednesday if a firm announces its earnings on Tuesday, but the return period is from last Friday to Tuesday if the firm announces its earnings on Monday.
variable for firm i is its return over a similar three-day window in response to the earnings announcements of other peer firms in the industry that have already announced (RESP). To ensure that ARET and RESP do not overlap and to mitigate potential problems with bid-ask bounce, we require that the peer's earnings announcement date precede firm i's earnings announcement date by at least five calendar days. Since there is typically more than one peer firm that announces its earnings earlier, the average value of RESP across those peers'
announcements is used to measure firm i's response to industry peers' earnings announcements.
Turning to the second set of returns-for peer firms-we measure similar event returns on the same two dates for those peers that announce earnings before firm i. That is, we calculate the returns over three-day windows for each of these peers at their own earnings announcement dates and at the earnings announcement date for the late-announcing firm i. We use the averages of these two returns across all eligible peers and refer to them as early peers' announcement return (ERLYPRARET) and early peers' response to the earnings announcement for firm i (ERLYPRRESP), respectively.
To illustrate how we measure RESP, ERLYPRARET, and ERLYPRRESP, consider the following example (see figure below). Assume that an industry has four firms (a, b, c, and i Further confirmation of the presence of momentum or underreaction is provided by the positive correlations between ARET and ARET t-1 , RESP and ARET t-1 , ARET and RET6, and RESP and RET6, where ARET t-1 and RET6 are the returns for firm i over the prior quarter's earnings 11 The positive correlation between ARET and ERLYPRARET is consistent with the lead-lag effect from large to small firms (Hou ,2007) , as early announcers tend to be larger firms.
announcement window and over the prior six months leading up to one week before firm i's earnings announcement date, respectively.
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Our main finding is that even though ARET and RESP are positively correlated with all other variables (ERLYPRARET, ERLYPRRESP, ARET t-1 , and RET6) that are separated in time, which is consistent with stock market underreaction to the information contained in the earlier price response in each pair, these two returns for late announcers (firm i) are negatively correlated with each other. This negative correlation suggests that the stock price for firm i overreacts to the information transferred from the earnings released by early announcers and is subsequently corrected when firm i announces its earnings. Note the important distinction between the news in early peers' earnings announcements (ERLYPRARET) and the implications of that news for the late announcer or the intra-industry information transferred to the late announcer (which is included in RESP): even though the two are positively correlated, ARET is positively related to the former but negatively related to the latter. Table 2 provides more details on the apparent overreaction described earlier (negative correlation between ARET and RESP) by sorting the sample into ten deciles based on RESP. The results in Table 2 indicate evidence of substantial price reversal. As RESP increases from D1 to D10, ARET exhibits a steady decrease from 0.68% in D1 to −0.48% in D10. A hedge portfolio (D1-D10) with a long position in D1 stocks and a short position in D10 stocks yields a three-day market excess return of 1.16 percent, with a t-statistic of 10.12. All t-statistics in this paper are based on the time-series distribution of hedge portfolios returns or slope coefficients estimated for each of the 132 quarters in our sample, as in Fama-MacBeth (1973) . 13 The return differential between D1 and D10 is not due to differences in size and book-to-market, two firm characteristics that potentially affect expected returns, as the results in the last two columns reveal that D1 and D10 are similar in terms of mean decile ranks for size (measured as market value of equity) and book-to-market.
Main results

Evidence of overreaction and cross-sectional variation in overreaction
Note that the spread of -1.11 percent for ERLYPRARET between the top and bottom RESP deciles is of the same magnitude as the corresponding spread for ARET (1.16 percent), even though RESP is contemporaneous with and in the same direction as ERLYPRARET whereas RESP and ARET are separated in time and move in opposite directions. In essence, much of RESP represents information that is unrelated to ERLYPRARET. The remainder can be separated into two components: a portion that represents overreaction to the implications of ERLYPARRET for the late announcer, indicated by a negative correlation between RESP and ARET, and a portion that represents underreaction to the implications of ERLYPRARET for the late announcer, indicated by a positive correlation between ERLYPRARET and ARET (documented in Table 1 , Panel B and Table 3 below). We return to these two components in Section 6.
Because of clustering in earnings announcement for firms in the same industry, our requirement that peers' announcement dates be at least 5 days earlier than firm i's earnings announcement eliminates many peers and also reduces the pool of late announcing firms; e.g., a second announcer that reports earnings within 5 days of the first announcer would be deleted from our sample. To estimate the impact of this reduction in sample, we repeated the analysis using one-day earnings announcement returns (day 0 alone) and consider all peer firms that announced their earnings before firm i's announcement date. 14 For this sample, only the first announcer in each industry is excluded from our sample. Our results are robust to this alternative specification. The one-day D1-D10 hedge return is 0.52% (t=6.99), which is consistent with the three-day hedge return of 1.16% (t=10.12) in Table 2 . Table 3 investigates the overreaction further by regressing ARET on RESP in the presence of control variables. These control variables include early peers' announcement returns (ERLYPRARET), the announcement returns for firm i in the prior quarter and the same fiscal quarter in the prior year (ARET t-1 and ARET t-4 ), log of market capitalization (SIZE), log of book to market ratio (BM), firm i's return over the prior six-months (RET6) and the level of accruals (ACC). RET6 and ACC are included to control for the price momentum and Sloan (1996) accrual anomalies, respectively. The results of the different regressions indicate that the magnitude of the coefficient on RESP and the associated t-statistics are relatively constant across the regressions reported in each column. 15 Overall, the negative relation between RESP and ARET appears unrelated to the different pricing anomalies considered here.
The analysis reported in Model 5 of Table 3 is designed to investigate whether the degree of overreaction differs across observations depending on the consistency between the news revealed by the early announcer (ERLYPRARET) and the implications of that news for the late announcer (RESP). Specifically, we use a dummy variable, D, which is set to 1 when RESP and 14 This sample, based on one-day announcement windows and no minimum gap between announcements for early announcing peers and firm i, contains 284,418 firm-quarters. Since our actual sample contains 245,742 firmquarters, we effectively reduced sample size by about 13.6 percent by using three-day announcement windows and requiring a 5-day minimum gap. 15 In fact, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on RESP increases slightly as we add control variables to the simple regression in column 1. Apparently, the correlations between RESP and the control variables (noted in Table 2 ) bias toward zero the magnitude of the coefficient on RESP in column 1 when the control variables are omitted.
ERLYPRARET are of the same sign, indicating that the good (bad) news reported by the early announcer implied good (bad) news for the late announcer. 16 Note that RESP incorporates considerable amount of firm-specific information, unrelated to the information transferred from ERLYPRARET. In essence, our consistency dummy is identifying cases where the late announcer's response contains relatively more information transfer and less firm-specific information. Observing a negative and significant coefficient on D*RESP in Table 3 indicates that the overreaction to information transfers is greater when there is more information transfer.
To determine if the overreaction is asymmetric between good and bad news, we repeated the model 5 regressions but reset the dummy variable to 1 when RESP is positive and 0 otherwise. 17 Untabulated results show that the coefficients on D and D*RESP are insignificant, which suggests that the overreaction is symmetric between good and bad news. We found similar results when we measure good and bad news based on ERLYPRARET rather than RESP.
Could risk explain the results?
Since we subtract market returns when calculating excess 3-day returns, it is possible that the excess returns we document may disappear if we measure risk properly and adjust excess returns for that risk. We offer three reasons why that possibility appears unlikely. First, given the short (three-day) windows over which we measure returns, the risk levels necessary to explain our results would be unreasonably large. This is because expected returns are close to zero for short windows, regardless of the return expectation model chosen by researchers (Fama 1998 ).
Second, our results are robust to controls for commonly accepted potential risk factors, such as size, market-to-book ratio, price momentum, and the post-earnings-announcement drift. Finally, if firm risk is relatively stable in the short term we should observe positive correlations between market-adjusted abnormal returns (which do not properly control for risk) at the two dates. The observed negative correlation in stock returns appears unlikely to be due to mismeasured risk since it requires large risk shifts to occur relatively quickly; i.e., a firm that is of high (low) risk when peers announce their earnings should become low (high) risk when it announces earnings a few days later. Overall, we conclude that it is unlikely that our results are caused by mismeasured risk (see additional evidence reported in section 5.4 that suggests that the risk changes required to explain those results would need to be even more complex).
Could market microstructure effects explain the results?
Because firm i and its peers are in the same industry and have the same fiscal quarterend, they tend to announce their earnings close to each other. As reported in Panel A of Table 1 the mean (median) time lag between firm i and its peers' earnings announcement dates is 13.68
(10.37) days. Given the proximity of the three-day windows associated with RESP and ARET, it is possible that the observed negative correlation is due at least partly to the microstructure effects that are partially responsible for the very short-term price reversals noted in the literature (e.g. , Jegadeesh 1990; and Lehmann 1990) . Whereas Sections 4.1 and 4.2 contain results of tests that focus on specific microstructure effects identified in prior research, we consider here a methodology that should control for spurious overreaction due to all potential microstructure effects. In the analysis described below, we make the conservative assumption that all of the very short term price reversal, referred to hereafter as the Jegadeesh effect, is due to market microstructure effects. To the extent we have overstated the impact of microstructure effects we are understating the extent to which the stock prices overreact to intra-industry transfers.
To gauge the extent to which our results are related to very short-term price reversals, we investigate the return pattern during a pseudo event period that does not contain earnings announcements. Specifically, we shift the event dates for RESP and ARET back by four weeks.
Shifting by four weeks rather than one month ensures that the pseudo events we create occur on the same weekday as the actual events, to remove any potential weekday effects. 18 We then calculate ARET, RESP, and ERLYPRARET on these pseudo event dates and repeat the RESP decile analysis reported in Table 2 .
Our results for pseudo event dates are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . The four-week shift in event dates produces 0.49 percent for the D1-D10 hedge portfolio for ARET. Note that the spread in RESP between D1 and D10, representing the spread in news across deciles for the nonannouncement period is comparable to that for the announcement period (-12.91 percent in Table   4 , Panel A, versus -13.06 percent in Table 2 ). The extent of overreaction that occurs on these pseudo event dates is substantial (and statistically significant, indicted by a t-statistic of 4.82) and the magnitudes are consistent with the very short-term price reversal noted in Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) .
More relevant to our analysis, Panel B in Table 4 provides the difference between the hedge returns reported in Panel A for pseudo events and those reported in Table 2 for the actual intra-industry transfer events. We report this difference for the overall sample period (in the first row) as well as for separate comparisons during the 1970's, 1980's, 1990's, and 2000's (in the four rows below). Our main finding is that the 0.49 percent hedge return reported for the overall sample period for pseudo events is considerable smaller than the 1.16 percent based on actual event dates (Table 2) , and this difference of 0.67 percent is statistically significant (t=4.25). Our second finding from the subperiod results in the remaining rows of Panel B is that investor overreaction appears to be weaker during the early part of our sample period. The difference in hedge returns between actual and pseudo events is smaller and insignificant in the 1970s, but larger and highly significant in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (See also Figure 2 , Panel B, and related discussion in Section 5.4).
The excess overreaction documented in Panel B of Table 4 represents a conservative estimate of the overreaction to intra-industry information transfers. Not all the overreaction observed in Panel A of Table 4 for pseudo events is due to market microstructure effects, and some of it is potentially due to overreaction to firm-specific news (e.g., Subrahmanyam 2005) .
Also, if microstructure effects are larger during periods when stocks are thinly traded and if earnings announcement periods are associated with more liquidity than non-announcement periods, overreaction due to microstructure effects is likely to be larger for the pseudo events in Panel A of Table 4 , relative to the actual events in Table 2 . Overall, we believe that while microstructure effects account for part of the anomaly observed here, much of the empirical regularity documented in Table 2 is consistent with overreaction to information released in early peers' earnings announcements.
Why do stock prices overreact to intra-industry information transfers?
The explanation we offer for the presence of overreaction is based on the average positive correlation in earnings news observed across firms in the same industry and bias caused by the representativeness heuristic (e.g., Chen, Frankel, and Kothari, 2004 We offer three analyses to investigate the validity of our overreaction explanation. First, we examine whether the overreaction differs across the first, second, and third early announcer in each industry/quarter. Observing smaller (larger) overreaction when the early announcer is the first (second and third) announcer would support this explanation. Because of the mechanical negative relation due to microstructure effects between the degree of overreaction and the time lag between the earnings announcements for the early and late announcers, we report the results in Table 5 separately for time lags equal to 5 days, 6 days, and so on, through 11 days. For example, when constructing samples for the 5-day time lag, we identify three samples containing all firms in each quarter that announce their earnings five days after the first, second, and third announcer's earnings release in each industry, respectively. Then we form five quintiles based on the firm's response to the early peer's earnings announcement (RESP), and calculate the mean announcement returns (ARET) for these different RESP quintiles. 20 The results in Table 5 suggest that the evidence of overreaction is weakest for the first announcer in each row (the lone exception being the row corresponding to time lag=8), but it is considerably larger when quintiles are formed based on the second or third announcer being the early announcer.
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Second, we consider differences in overreaction between the subsample where the early announcers tend to report news that is "confirming", or positively correlated with each other, and the remaining observations with early announcers reporting news that is disconfirming. Our explanation would predict that the overreaction would be greater for the first subsample, as overreaction is more likely to occur in the presence of confirming reports. Since there are typically more than two early announcers, we use the following procedure to identify the confirming subsample. For each late announcing firm i, we split the early announcers into two groups based on the median time lag between the announcement dates for the early announcers and the late announcer. For example if firm i has six early peers from the same industry/quarter, the first group consists of the first three early announcers and the second group contains the last three early announcers. We compute the mean values of information transfers for the two groups and label them RESP1 and RESP2. We then create a dummy variable, D, that is set to 1 if RESP1
and RESP2 are of the same sign, and set to 0 otherwise. In effect, D=1 represents the subsample with confirming information transfers, and D=0 represents the remaining firms.
The results reported in the first column of Table 6 suggest that the overreaction is larger when the two subsamples provide confirming information transfers. The basis for this conclusion 20 We use quintiles rather than deciles of RESP to increase the likelihood of finding at least five firms in each quarter for the different announcer/time lag combinations. 21 We find similar patterns when the time lag is greater than 11 but elected to not tabulate those results because the hedge returns tend to become insignificant in each case even though the magnitude is still large. The lack of significance when the time lag is large is probably due to fewer observations in each portfolio.
is the significantly negative coefficient of -0.055 on D*RESP. The second column contains the results of repeating the analysis using the early announcer's earnings announcement return (ERLYPRARET), rather than the late announcer's response to this announcement (RESP), as the measure of news. Again, the coefficient on D*RESP is negative and significant.
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Finally, we attempt to track the stock returns for each late announcer over the period beginning with the first early announcement through the late announcer's earnings report and continuing up to the late announcer's earnings report for the next quarter. To allow a clean separation between the late announcer's responses to the first announcement and to subsequent early announcers, we create a sample of observations where the early announcer is restricted to be the first early announcer for that industry/quarter in our sample. We compute excess returns for each late announcer i over the following two windows to supplement RESP and ARET:, a) PRERET is the excess return for firm i over the window between the dates used to compute RESP and ARET, during which other early announcements are made, and b) POSTRET is the excess return for the period between ARET and the next quarter's earnings announcement window; i.e., from the 2 nd day after the earnings announcement for this quarter to the 1 st day after the earnings announcement for the next quarter. In effect, the four adjacent windows (RESP, PRERET, ARET, and POSTRET) provide a comprehensive description of firm i's stock response to this quarter's earnings.
Our explanation predicts that the overreaction around subsequent early announcements (indicated by a negative correlation between PRERET and ARET) will be greater than the overreaction around the first early announcement (indicated by a negative correlation between 22 We expect weaker results for ERLYPRARET, relative to RESP, for two reasons. First, RESP contains the news transferred, which is more relevant to our explanation than ERLYPRARET. Second, the larger positive mean reported for ERLYPRARET in Table 1 , Panel A, relative to that for RESP, suggests that there is more measurement error associated with using the sign of ERLYPRARET in column 2, relative to that in column 1 (which is based on the sign of RESP).
RESP and ARET). We include POSTRET to determine if the overreaction that occurs during RESP and PRERET is fully corrected when the late announcer reports its earnings (ARET). If the correction is not complete at that point, POSTRET should be negatively related to RESP and
PRERET.
Given the substantial negative correlation observed in our pseudo event analysis (Table   4) , we again create a pseudo event dataset for the subsample based on first early announcements by shifting event dates back by four weeks. We pool together the two data sets and separate the two sets of observations by setting a dummy variable (D) equal to 1 for observations associated with the actual event and equal to 0 for observations in the pseudo data set. In effect we estimate separate coefficients for both datasets and the difference between the two coefficients (measured by the coefficient on the slope interacted with the dummy variable) indicates the overreaction due to intra-industry information transfers, after controlling for any overreaction due to the Jegadeesh (1990) effect.
The results of our investigation are reported in Table 7 . The three columns correspond to cases where the dependent variable is the return for the late announcing firm i over the second, third, and fourth windows, and the explanatory variables in each column include firm i's returns for all earlier windows. Each explanatory variable is also interacted with the dummy variable to estimate the incremental overreaction observed for actual events, above and beyond that present in the pseudo event data. The coefficient on RESP in column 1 is substantially negative, indicating a strong Jegadeesh effect. The coefficient on D*RESP is positive, but not significant, suggesting that the response to the first announcement is only weakly positively correlated to the average response to subsequent early announcers.
Column 2 in Table 7 , which describes cross-sectional variation in ARET due to RESP and PRERET, contains the results most relevant to our explanation. The overreaction at the first early announcement, indicated by the coefficient of −0.017 on D*RESP, is weaker than that at subsequent early announcements, indicated by the substantially more negative coefficient of −0.178 on D*PRERET. 23 Note that the coefficient on PRERET is more negative than that on RESP, confirming that the Jegadeesh effect (measured on pseudo events) is lower when the windows are further apart.
The results in Column 3 of Table 7 indicate whether the overreaction to early announcers is fully corrected when the late announcer reports its earnings. The absence of a significant negative coefficient on D*RESP, D*PRERET, and D*ARET suggests that there is no continuation of the correction past the late announcer's earnings report. In fact, the positive coefficients on those three variables suggest that not only is there no more correction of overreaction at this point, the underreaction associated with earnings momentum is now dominant. The Jegadeesh effect is indicated by the negative coefficients on PRERET and ARET, with the former being less negative than the latter. The fact that the coefficient on RESP is no longer negative (it is positive, but insignificant) confirms that the Jegadeesh effect is relatively short-lived and does not survive at longer horizons.
23 Since the PRERET window includes both days when information was transferred from early announcements occurring on those days and other days when no announcements occurred, we investigated whether the results were more pronounced for the subset of days that were associated with information transfers, when early announcers reported earnings. We split the return for firm i over the PRERET period into two subsets based on whether each day in that period was included in or excluded from the 3-day announcement windows for early announcers, and the returns over the two subsets are referred to as PRERETTRANSFER and PRERETNOTRANSFER, respectively. We then re-estimated the regression in column 2 of Table 7 , after replacing PRERET with PRERETTRANSFER and PRERETNOTRANSFER. We found that while the coefficient on D*PRERETTRANSFER is more negative than that on D*PRERETNOTRANSFER (-0.114 versus -0.082), that difference is not statistically significant. This inability to observe a significant difference between the two subsets of PRERET could possibly be due to information transfers occurring outside the 3-day announcement windows considered here.
Overall, these three sets of results are consistent with our explanation that the overreaction we document is relatively low in response to the first early announcer, but it builds thereafter in response to subsequent early announcements, and is corrected when the late announcer discloses its earnings.
Robustness checks
We provide below the results of our efforts to conduct four additional robustness checks.
We also considered a number of other robustness checks, such as the inclusion of non-December fiscal year end firms, and find that our overreaction results remain relatively unchanged.
Potential bias in CRSP returns because closing prices are systematically bid or ask prices
While the pseudo event analysis described in Table 4 and section 3.3 should control for the negative correlation induced in adjacent period stock returns based on closing prices that are systematically bid and ask prices, it is possible that the pseudo event control is insufficient as the bid-ask spread could be higher during announcement events. To gauge the effect of this bid-ask bounce on our main results we consider a return measure that is free of such an effect. We construct daily returns using the midpoints of closing bid and ask prices; i.e., daily return = (P t + D t -P t-1 )/P t-1 , where P is the midpoint of the closing bid and ask prices and D is the dividend (all adjusted for stock splits). Since closing bid and ask prices are available on CRSP only after December 28, 1992, the sample for this analysis is limited to the 1992-2005 sub-period.
As in Table 2 , we form ten RESP deciles but measure returns based on bid-ask midpoints. Untabulated results indicate that ARET decreases monotonically from 0.57% for Decile 1 to -0.78% for Decile 10, resulting in a D1-D10 hedge portfolio return of 1.35% (t=6.56). For comparison purposes, we also replicate the same analyses based on returns as reported in CRSP for the same sample of firms and find that the D1-D10 hedge return is 1.61%, with a t-statistic of 8.54. The hedge return is smaller when using mid-point prices than it is when using CRSP reported returns, suggesting that bid-ask bounce is partially responsible for the overreaction documented in Tables 2 and 3 . But the effect of the bid-ask bounce on hedge returns (roughly 0.26 percent) is relatively small compared to the overall overreaction effect of 1.61 percent.
Further evidence on the microstructure effects
Prior literature has examined the role of microstructure effects on return reversals. For example, Avramov et al. (2006) argue that price pressure resulting from a large block of trades could induce very-short term price reversals for illiquid stocks. We believe that our pseudo analysis from Section 3.3 provides a reasonable control for illiquidity and other microstructure effects as long as these effects are relatively stable over the short term. Nevertheless, we conduct robustness checks using proxies for microstructure effects mentioned in the prior literature.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 8 contain the results of a portfolio analysis where we report hedge portfolio results (ARET for low RESP quintiles less ARET for high RESP quintiles) for different subsamples based on variation in three proxies for cross-sectional differences in microstructure effects. We use quintiles rather than deciles to ensure that we retain a reasonable number of observations in each of the 25 portfolios in each quarter.
The first proxy for market microstructure effects we consider is firm size (SIZE), measured as logarithm of market capitalization. Observing overreaction only for small firms might suggest that the results reported in Table 2 are due to lower liquidity and trading volumes and higher bid-ask spreads associated with smaller firms. Panels B and C in Table 8 show how overreaction varies across five monthly ILLIQ and TO quintiles, respectively. The RESP effect is highly significant in each ILLIQ (TO) quintile. In terms of magnitude, the RESP1-RESP5 hedge returns are relatively stable for the first four ILLIQ (TO) quintiles but tend to be higher for the highest ILLIQ (TO) quintile. Therefore, lack of liquidity may tend to exaggerate the overreaction effect for a small subset of our sample with high ILLIQ and TO, but the presence of large and significant hedge returns even for stocks that have the lowest ILLIQ and TO suggests that the Avramov et al. effects are unlikely to explain completely the overreaction we document.
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Panel D in Table 8 presents the regression results when we interact RESP with the three proxies for microstructure effects. The first three regressions consider each proxy separately to determine whether the differences in overreaction across the microstructure proxy quintiles in Panels A through C are statistically significant. The insignificant coefficients observed on DSIZE*RESP, DILLIQ*RESP, and DTO*RESP in the first three columns of Panel D suggest that the differences in overreaction across the columns in Panel A, B, and C are not statistically significant. The fourth regression, which considers all three proxies simultaneously, confirms that the interactive terms continue to remain insignificant. Note that the coefficients on DSIZE, DILLIQ, and DTO are significant in the fourth regression. These results suggest that announcement returns for late announcers are on average higher (unconditional on earnings news) for smaller firms, for more liquid firms, and for firms with lower turnover.
Whereas firm size, illiquidity, and turnover are included in this analysis because they proxy for microstructure effects, prior literature on pricing anomalies has also considered these three variables as proxies for limits to arbitrage; i.e., an anomaly is more likely to be due to investor irrationality if it is stronger for stocks that are harder to arbitrage (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Barberis and Thaler 2003) . To provide some evidence on limits to arbitrage, we first control for potential microstructure effects associated with these three proxies and then investigate if overreaction is stronger when firm size is smaller, and illiquidity and turnover are higher. Specifically, we repeat the portfolio analysis in Table 8 for both actual earnings announcement events and pseudo events (moved back by four weeks) and check if the return difference between actual and pseudo events varies across the three proxies. Untabulated results
show that the differential overreaction is stronger for smaller stocks, illiquid stocks, and stocks with high turnover, consistent with investor irrationality playing a greater role in these cases.
The role of the predictability of earnings announcement dates
Since the analysis so far is based on actual Compustat earnings announcement dates, a trading strategy based on this anomaly can only be implemented if those actual dates can be predicted in advance. However, some earnings announcement dates are not perfectly predictable.
For example, some firms may delay earnings announcement due to accounting irregularities, and these firms tend to be associated with negative market excess returns. A concentration of these firms in the D10 decile might explain our results. To mitigate this concern, we examine whether our results are driven by the timeliness of a firm's earnings announcement (TIMELY) relative to the expected report date measured as the actual report date for the same fiscal quarter in the previous year. We report the mean values of ARET for the 25 combinations based on quintiles of RESP and TIMELY. Table 9 shows that our results are largely independent of the timeliness of earnings announcements. We observe a strong RESP effect across all five timeliness quintiles. Holding RESP constant, we find that the excess returns tend to be positive for earnings reports published earlier than expected and negative for earnings reports published later than expected, a result consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Givoly and Palmon, 1982, and Chambers and Penman, 1984) . Finally, Table 9 also shows that about three-fifths of the firms (quintiles 2-4) report their earnings within 2 to 4 days of the report date of the previous year, on average, which is a relatively small margin of error considering that weekends and holidays will naturally introduce some variation in this measure. Overall, the impression is one of regular, predictable reporting behavior by individual stocks (see also Chambers and Penman 1984) , suggesting that we would find similar results if we were to consider an implementable trading strategy that did not use information in advance about actual earnings dates to measure ARET.
Consistency with which the hedge returns are observed over time
One standard approach to investigate the robustness of results observed at an aggregate level is to repeat the analysis over different subperiods and check if the result is observed consistently in each subperiod. Figure 2 contains the results for each of the 132 quarters in our sample from implementing a simulated trading strategy based on overreaction to intra-industry information transfers from early announcers to late announcers. The hedge returns from investing long (short) in late announcers in the lowest (highest) decile of RESP around their announcement dates reveal a consistent pattern of profitability. The mean hedge return is 1.16%, and losses are observed in only 21 of the 132 quarters, with most of these negative returns being relatively small. Also, the RESP effect is weakest during the 1970s (mean hedge returns of 0.48%), and is higher during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (mean of 1.01%, 1.55%, and 1.52% respectively). This consistent profitability suggests that the observed empirical regularity is unlikely to be associated with mismeasured risk; if the strategy was risky, there should be more quarters associated with significant losses.
Discussion of overreaction evidence, given general evidence of underreaction
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is hard in general for an irrational investor explanation to reconcile apparent overreaction amidst considerable underreaction over the same horizon. It is harder still for any explanation to also be consistent with specific features of the evidence documented here, some of which are as follows: a) underreaction to own firm earnings (positive partial correlation between D*ARET and POSTRET in Table 7 ), b) overreaction to information transfers from early peers' announcements that is corrected when late announcer reports earnings (general negative correlation between RESP and ARET), c) overreaction to information transfer is lower at the first early announcer's report but increases as subsequent early announcers report earnings (partial correlation between ARET and D*RESP in Table 7 Our review of the behavioral finance literature did not suggest a theory that provided a comprehensive explanation for the various facets of our evidence noted above. For example, the overreaction explanations based on representativeness would also predict an overreaction to information transfers from late announcers to early peers. While some theories offer explanations for both under and overreaction, the predicted positive and negative autocorrelation in returns relate to different horizons, and generally do not relate to cross-firm lead/lag relations. The explanation in Peng and Xiong (2006) appeared promising initially, as it offers a theory based on investor overconfidence and limited investor attention which suggests positive comovement across returns of firms in the same sector, and also negative autocorrelation in firm-level returns. 28 . Unfortunately, the theory does not fit well with specific aspects of our evidence (e.g., items c) and d) mentioned in the first paragraph of this section).
One extension of our explanation for overreaction that could also potentially explain the underreaction effects is as follows. Consider the possibility that the late announcer's response to early announcers' earnings reports is in the right direction but the "correction" in the opposite direction at the late announcer's earnings report is in error. That is, stock prices are in general underreacting to the full implications of news being released this quarter by firms in the same industry, and the price movement at the late announcer's earnings report is a temporary adjustment in the wrong direction. This explanation is consistent with a stock market that is unaware of the spillover effects of this quarter's earnings surprise at the earnings announcement (Lys and Soffer, 1999) but incorporates those spillover effects as information is released subsequently about the next quarter's earnings (Ball and Bartov, 1996) .
To illustrate this "temporary erroneous correction" explanation, assume that a late announcer is going to disclose a seasonally-adjusted earnings increase of $0.10 in this quarter, which implies on average a seasonally-adjusted earnings increase of $0.04 in the next quarter (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990) . Assume also that the price implications of these two surprises are $1.00 and $0.40, respectively; i.e., the price in an efficient market should rise by $1.40 as soon as the earnings surprise for this quarter is known, but the prices will increase by only $1.00 when this quarter's earnings are released, with the remaining increase of $0.40 occurring by the time next quarter's earnings are released. Finally, assume that the first early announcer's report causes investors to revise their earnings expectations for this quarter to $0.10 (which is unbiased) and to bid prices up by $1.00. The release of positively correlated earnings surprises by other early announcers this quarter could cause investors to expect an earnings increase this quarter that is greater than $0.10, say $0.11. As a result, prices will rise by an additional $0.10.
However, that increase will be given back when investors are disappointed by the disclosed earnings of $0.10. Over the next quarter, however, prices continue their upward climb toward the final price increase of $1.40.
While this extension to our overreaction explanation provides a relatively straightforward rationale for different facets of our results, an important testable implication is not supported.
That implication is that RESP (the price response of the late announcer to the earnings release of early announcers, corresponding to the increase of $0.11 in the illustration above) should be positively correlated with POSTRET (the price response of the later announcer between the earnings releases in this quarter and the next, corresponding to the increase of $0.40 in the illustration above). The results in column 3 of Table 7 reveal that although the coefficient on D*RESP is positive (=0.003), it is insignificant at conventional levels (t-statistic of 0.21). Since Table 7 is based only on the first early announcer, we re-estimated the column 3 regression using all early announcers. The results (not tabulated) again do not support this explanation: while the coefficient on D*RESP is positive (=0.0003), it remains insignificant at conventional levels (tstatistic of 0.38).
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We return to our original overreaction explanation and consider a different extension to generate a description of investor irrationality that is consistent with both overreaction and underreaction to earnings information and the overreaction being corrected when the late announcer discloses its earnings, even though the underreaction continues past that date. We begin by separating earnings information into two components: one part that has spillover implications for adjacent quarters and a second part that does not, and assume that investors are unable to project spillover effects until they become apparent. We posit that the earnings information that is contained in intra-industry information transfers from early announcers to firms that have not yet announced is for the most part described by the second earnings component, which does not have implications for adjacent quarters. As a result, any stock price overreaction leading up to the late announcer's earnings report will be corrected when those earnings are disclosed.
In contrast, information transfers from earnings reports of late announcers to early announcers must relate to subsequent quarters, since early announcers have already disclosed their earnings for this quarter. To the extent that investors do not fully project the implications of that earnings information for future quarters' earnings, stock prices will underreact to that intraindustry transfer information. For the same reason, investors will underreact to all other earnings 29 Positive but insignificant coefficients on D*RESP are observed even when we exclude the terms relating to ARET and also the terms relating to PRERET.
information that is generated by sources other than intra-industry transfers, as long as some fraction of that earnings information has implications for future quarters' earnings.
To review, we have provided the results of our efforts to generate potential explanations for different facets of the anomalous evidence noted in this paper. While we reject some of those explanations and offer one explanation that is consistent with the joint evidence of over and underreaction, we believe there is considerable room for future research to probe that explanation as well as to suggest other theories.
Conclusion
We document an anomalous negative relation between the price response of a firm to earlier earnings announcements of other firms in the same industry and the returns of the same firm when it subsequently announces its own earnings. Our results are not easily explained as being due to investor irrationality because this negative own-firm return relation (implying investor overreaction to intra-industry information transfers) is surrounded by other positive own-firm and cross-firm return relations (which imply investor underreaction to all other earnings news) The following is a summary of what readers can take away from our efforts to understand the results reported in this paper.
First, we consider carefully the possibility that our results are due to some explanation other than investor irrationality, but find no supporting evidence. In particular, we do not believe our results are caused by microstructure effects or mismeasured risk.
Second, we can provide a straightforward irrational investor explanation for apparent investor overreaction. That explanation, which is consistent with bias caused by investors relying on the representativeness heuristic, suggests that investors are surprised by firms in the same industry reporting earnings surprises that are predictably positively correlated. We are able to explain why this causes an overreaction to information transferred from early announcers to the late announcer, why the overreaction increases as subsequent early announcers release their earnings, and why the overreaction is reversed at the late announcer's earnings report.
Third, we make some progress on generating possible unified theories for overreaction amidst widespread underreaction and investigate the extent to which they are consistent with all facets of our evidence. Our review of the behavioral finance literature suggests that while different theories can explain different aspects of our results, it is difficult to combine those theories in a meaningful way. We also considered explanations that are based on investors not understanding the extent to which news in earnings this quarter spills over to adjacent quarters'
earnings (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1990) . One such variation that is consistent with our evidence is based on earnings information containing two components: one part that has spillover effects for adjacent quarters and a second part that does not. We posit that the earnings information that is contained in intra-industry information transfers from early announcers to firms that have not yet announced is for the most part described by the second earnings component, which does not have implications for adjacent quarters. We suspect, however, that there are other explanations and encourage future research to build on what we develop here. 
Variables:
RET6 : The buy-and-hold 6-month stock returns up to one week before firm i's earnings announcement date.
ARET t-1 : Firm i 's three-day earnings announcement excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around the earnings announcement date in quarter t-1 RESP : The average of firm i's three-day excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around its peers' earnings announcements, where the earnings announcement dates are at least five days prior to firm i 's earnings announcement date.
ARET : Firm i's three-day earnings announcement excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around the earnings announcement date in quarter t ERLYPRARET : The average of peers' three-day excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around earnings announcement in quarter t, where the announcement dates are at least five days prior to firm i 's earnings announcement date.
ERLYPRRESP:
The average of peers' three-day excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around firm i 's earnings announcements. 
TIME LINE
Figure2: Quarter by quarter profits from investing in overreaction to intra-industry information transfers
The strategy invests long (short) in firms that are in the lowest (highest) RESP decile, where RESP is a firm's average return in response to its peers' earnings announcements made at least five days prior to the firm's own earnings announcement. The investments are made one day before the late announcer's earnings announcement and held for one day after the announcement.
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RESP
The average of firm i's 3-day excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around its peers' earnings announcements, where the earnings announcement dates are at least five days prior to firm i's earnings announcement date. ERLYPRRESP The average of early peers' three-day excess returns (raw returns -value-weighted market returns) around firm i's earnings announcements. ACC Accruals measured as the change in non-cash working capital minus depreciation expense (data14) scaled by average total assets (data6), where the change in noncash working capital is equal to the change in non-cash current assets (data4 -data1) minus the change in current liabilities (data5) less short-term debt (data34).
MV
Market value at the end of prior fiscal year (data199*data25). BM Book-to-Market ratio measured as book value of equity (data60) divided by its market value at the end of prior fiscal year.
RET6
The buy-and-hold 6-month stock returns up to one week before firm i's earnings announcement date. TIME The average number of days between firm i's and its peers' earnings announcement dates.
NPEER
The number of peers that announce earnings at least five days prior to firm i's earnings announcement date. ARET is firm i's 3-day earnings announcement excess returns; RESP is the average of firm i's 3-day excess returns around its peers' earnings announcements; ERLYPRARET is the average of its early peers' 3-day earnings announcement excess returns in the same quarter, and ERLYPRRESP is the average of its early peers' 3-day excess returns around firm i's earnings announcement. SIZERANK (BMRANK) is the decile ranking of a firm's market value of equity (book-to-market ratio), with the bottom (top) decile assigned a value of 1 (10). See Table 1 ARET is firm i's 3-day earnings announcement excess returns; RESP is the average of firm i's 3-day excess returns around its peers' earnings announcements; ERLYPRARET is the average of its early peers' 3-day earnings announcement excess returns in the same quarter, and ERLYPRRESP is the average of its early peers' 3-day excess returns around firm i's earnings announcement. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value at the end of prior fiscal year; and LOGBM is the logarithm of the book-to-Market ratio; RET6 is the buy-and-hold 6-month stock returns leading up to one week before firm i's earnings announcement date; and ACC is total accruals. In model 5, D is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if RESP*ERLYPRARET>0 and 0 otherwise; i.e., D=1 if the early announcer's news and the late announcer's response are consistent. See Table 1 To examine the role of very short term price reversals, we create pseudo events by shifting all events back by four weeks and repeating the Table 2 analysis. ARET is firm i's 3-day pseudo earnings announcement excess returns; RESP is the average of firm i's 3-day excess returns around its peers' pseudo earnings announcements; ERLYPRARET is the average of its early peers' 3-day pseudo earnings announcement excess returns. In panel A, we sort firms into ten deciles each quarter based on RESP, and portfolio returns are average stock returns of firms in each decile. Portfolios with fewer than ten stocks are eliminated. In Panel B we compare the results for pseudo events with those for the actual events reported in Table 2, This table examines the effect of confirming vs. non-confirming information on investors' overreaction to intra-industry information transfers. ARET, the dependent variable, is firm i's 3-day earnings announcement excess returns; RESP is the average of firm i's 3-day excess returns around its peers' earnings announcements; ERLYPRARET is the average of its early peers' 3-day earnings announcement excess returns in the same quarter. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value at the end of prior fiscal year; and LOGBM is the logarithm of Book-to-Market ratio; RET6 is the buyand-hold 6-month stock returns leading up to one week before firm i's earnings announcement date; and ACC is total accruals. Additional details of all variables are provided in Table 1 . We split the early announcers for each late announcing firm into two groups based on the median earnings announcement dates for the early announcing peers. For example, if firm i has six early peers, the first group consists of the first three early announcing peers and the second group includes the last three early announcing peers. We compute the mean values of two information variables, RESP and ERLYPRARET, for each subgroup. For each information variable, we set the dummy variable D=1 if the sign of the information variable in the first half (RESP1 and ERLYPRARET1) equals the sign of that information variable in the second half (RESP2 and ERLYPRARET2). We create two data sets, one based on actual earnings announcements and the other based on pseudo events, created by shifting the dates backward by 4 weeks for the observations in the first data set. For each late announcer (firm i), we focus only on the first early announcer in that quarter, and compute returns over the following four windows in both data sets. RESP is the 3-day excess return for firm i around the earnings announcement date for the first early announcer and ARET is the 3-day excess return around firm i's earnings announcement date. PRERET is the excess return for firm i over the window between the dates used to compute RESP and ARET, and POSTRET is the excess return for the period from the 2 nd day after the earnings announcement for that quarter to the day after the earnings announcement for the next quarter. We then pool the two data sets but separate the two sets of observations using a dummy variable, D, which is set to 1 if the data relate to the true event and 0 if the data refer to the pseudo event. In effect the coefficients on RESP, PRERET, and ARET capture the overreaction due to the Jegadeesh (1990) effect, since they are observed for pseudo events. The coefficients on the same variables when they are interacted by the dummy variable (e.g., D*RESP) represent the overreaction due to intra-industry information transfers, after controlling for the Jegadeesh (1990) effect. This table describes how overreaction (the negative correlation between ARET and RESP) varies across three proxies for microstructure effects (SIZE, ILLIQ, or TO), where SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity; ILLIQ is illiquidity measured as the average of the absolute value of daily returns scaled by dollar trading volume (in million dollars) over the month leading up to one week prior to firm i's earnings announcement date; TO is stock turnover measured as dollar trading volume over the month leading up to one week prior to firm i's earnings announcement date scaled by beginning market value of equity; and ARET and RESP are firm i's excess returns around its own and its early announcing peers' earnings announcement dates. See Table 1 for detailed definitions. Panels A, B and C refer to portfolio analyses based on quintiles of the relevant explanatory variables. Each quarter, we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on the proxy for microstructure effects, and then for each resulting quintile we further sort stocks into five RESP portfolios. Portfolios with fewer than ten stocks are eliminated. Panel D refers to regression analyses based on deciles of the three microstructure variables-DTO, DILLIQ, and DSIZEwhich are formed each quarter. The decile ranks are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1. To help interpret the coefficients, we demean the three decile ranks and RESP each quarter. We report the time-series mean of the quarterly portfolio returns or coefficient estimates across 132 quarters from 1973:I to 2005:IV; t-statistics in parentheses are Fama-MacBeth t-statistics. All variables except ARET are Winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
